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I. Introduction
The Internet has, in recent decades, become the center of our 
world.  It is where we search for information, how we keep up on 
current events in real time, and now, where we share copious 
amounts of information about ourselves.  The boom of social 
networking websites1 such as Facebook,2 MySpace,3 and Twitter4 has 
allowed individuals to disseminate personal information at an 
alarming rate—from our basic contact information, to our interests, 
to photographs, and updates about our every move, and thought. 
* University of California, Hastings College of the Law, J.D. Candidate 2011.
Stanford University, B.A. American Studies, with Departmental Honors and Distinction, 
2007.  Danielle would like to thank Professor John Diamond for overseeing this paper, 
and her family for their unyielding love, encouragement, and support. 
1. See James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1142 (2009)
(Social networks are defined as “web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct 
a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users 
with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and 
those made by others within the system.”) (internal citation omitted). 
2. FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Jan. 25, 2010).
3. MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com (last visited Jan. 25, 2010).
4. TWITTER, http://www.twitter.com (last visited Jan. 25, 2010).
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With so many people uploading sensitive information to their 
Facebook profiles, there have been many unintended consequences—
“[j]obs have been lost, reputations smeared, embarrassing secrets 
broadcast to the world.”5  Most significantly, however, the rise of 
social networks as a new medium of communication has provided a 
new frontier of how the government can gain access and use that 
information in criminal investigations and prosecutions. 
On December 1, 2009, The Electronic Frontier Foundation 
(“EFF”), along with the Samuelson Law, Technology, and Public 
Policy Clinic at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law 
(“Samuelson Clinic”), filed a lawsuit against several government 
agencies seeking the release of records under the Freedom of 
Information Act (“FOIA”),6 concerning how those agencies use 
social-networking websites as investigative, surveillance, and data 
collection tools.7  This lawsuit marks an important acknowledgment 
that there are not clearly defined ways in which governmental 
agencies take advantage of the copious amounts of data provided by 
social networking sites.  The Samuelson Clinic also co-sponsored a 
conference (“Samuelson Conference”) addressing the legal and 
ethical issues surrounding data gathering on social networking sites, 
the contents of which will be referred to throughout this note.8 
The EFF’s lawsuit is especially important because social 
networking statistics are phenomenal: Facebook has hit the three 
hundred million users mark, MySpace has one hundred and twenty-
five million accounts, and in September 2009, Twitter had twenty 
million visitors.9  Amongst the eighteen- to twenty-four-year-old 
demographic, almost seventy-five percent are using social networks.10 
This Note will examine the ways in which social networking sites 
and the government’s search for information collide.  Part Two will 
5. Grimmelmann, supra note 1, at 1140. (Noting that “[o]ver a hundred million
people have uploaded personally sensitive information to Facebook, and many of them 
have been badly burnt as a result.”) 
6. Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2010).
7. Elect. Frontier Found. v. Dept. of Defense, 2009 WL 4813489 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 1,
2009).  The case also names the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Homeland 
Security, Department of Justice, Department of Treasury, and Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence as defendants.  See also Press Release, Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, Lawsuit Demands Answers About Social-Networking Surveillance (Nov. 30, 
2009) available at http://www.eff.org/press/archives/2009/11/30. 
8. Samuelson Conference, Social Networks: Friends or Foes? Confronting Online
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look at Facebook, examining its privacy policies and how information 
and data are shared on the site.  It will then discuss the ways in which 
the government has used both Facebook and similar social 
networking sites in its investigations.  Part Three will outline the 
statutory framework through which the government operates to gain 
access to electronic data and analyze its impact by examining case law 
surrounding those information privacy statutes as they apply to 
Fourth Amendment litigation.  Finally, Part Four will discuss the 
intersection between the law as it currently stands, and social 
networking sites.  The law has not quite kept pace with the speed of 
technology.  As a result, the boundaries of individual privacy—as 
applied to the government’s use of social networking information—
are in need of revisions. 
II. Social Networks
Facebook’s domination of the social network market makes it an 
ideal case study through which to demonstrate the enormous amount 
of information that users are able to share through the social network 
medium.  According to the site’s Privacy Policy, “[o]ne of the primary 
reasons people use Facebook is to share content with others.”11 
Facebook users share and display a vast amount of content. 
Facebook users complete profiles that can contain up to about forty 
pieces of recognizable personal information.12  This includes “name, 
birthday, political and religious views; online and offline contact 
information; gender, sexual preference, and relationship status; 
favorite books, movies, and so on; educational and employment 
history; and, of course, picture[s].”13  It has been further noted that 
Facebook is storing over twenty billion photos.14  What is more 
alarming is that Facebook’s users share this information with 
thousands of others—information which is “indexed to create 
powerful mosaics of personal data.”15 
9. David Lee, Problems Unique to Social Networking and the Law, address at
Samuelson Conference, (Oct. 23, 2009), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu 
/7458.htm. 
10. Id.
11. See Privacy Policy (Facebook), available at http://www.facebook.com/policy.php
(last visited Jan. 25, 2010). 
12. Grimmelmann, supra note 1, at 1149.
13. Id.
14. Lee, supra note 9.
15. Jonathan Zittrain, Law in a Networked World: Privacy 2.0+, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL.
F. 65, 100 (2008).
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Although users can control how much information they feel 
comfortable sharing on Facebook and adjust their privacy settings 
accordingly, it is almost certain that at least some of a user’s “friends” 
will be able to see the content that he or she posts.16  For example, 
hypothetically speaking, a user went to high school with Jane Doe; he 
searches for her on Facebook.  If her privacy settings are such that 
she comes up in his search results, he can send her a message 
requesting that she accepts his friendship.17  Then, the ball is in her 
court.  She can unequivocally accept, granting him full access to all of 
the bits of information that she posts about herself, or, she can place 
him on a “limited profile,” where she controls what information he 
can see, by limiting his access to only certain content. 
Being a user’s “friend,” however, is not the only way that 
someone might gain access to a user’s information.  For example, a 
user might adjust his privacy settings so that everyone in his 
“Networks”18 or all “Friends of Friends” can see certain posts.19  For 
example, if a user posts an album with hundreds of pictures and 
allows everyone in his Stanford University network to see them, then 
the 50,587 members of that network (as of January 2010) would be 
able to see those pictures, regardless of whether they are “friends” 
with the user. 
Methods of communication on social networking sites such as 
Facebook are also numerous.  Users can send each other messages 
within the site, a feature that functions as Facebook’s own version of 
emails.  Users can also post messages on each other’s walls to convey 
information that they wish to be more public.20 
16. “Friend” connections are the primary way that Facebook users are linked.  When
users are “friends,” they generally have access to each other’s profiles and the information 
that they therefore post. 
17. Users can adjust their privacy settings so that, at the most narrow, they are not
searchable to anyone, even though their profile exists.  At the opposite end of the 
spectrum, a user can be searchable to “Everyone,” which means, anyone with a Facebook 
account. 
18. A “Network” is a workplace or school that a user is or has been affiliated with.  In
order to join a school’s network, for example, Facebook requires that a user verify his 
membership there with a valid school email address. 
19. For a definition of “posts” see “Definitions,” section 17 on Facebook’s
“Statements of Rights and Resposibilities,”  available at http://www.facebook.com/ 
terms.php (last visited Jan. 25, 2010). 
20. “[A] wall is a section in your profile where others can write messages to you or
leave you gifts, which are icon-like small images. The wall is a public writing space so 
others who view your profile can see what has been written on your wall. Once you have 
received a wall message, you can respond directly back to the friend who left it using the 
“wall-to-wall” mode.”  Definition of Facebook Wall, WEBOPEDIA.COM, 
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/F/Facebook_wall.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2010). 
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Because there are so many pieces of data floating around and 
there are so many different ways that users can be connected to one 
another, it is not surprising that Facebook and other social 
networking sites are rapidly becoming attractive places for the 
government to find pertinent information.  The FBI, for example, has 
undercover agents in virtually every social network context.21  
Facebook explicitly warns that it “may disclose information pursuant 
to subpoenas, court orders, or other requests (including criminal and 
civil matters) if [they] have a good faith belief that the response is 
required by law.”22 
There have been several instances where the government—via 
local detectives, to prosecutors, to federal officials—has used 
information on social networking sites as “investigative, surveillance, 
and data collection tools.”23  John Carlin, Chief of Staff and Senior 
Counsel to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(“FBI”), delivered the keynote address at the Samuelson Conference 
where he revealed that the FBI has joined social networks and has 
used them in a variety of circumstances.24 
When a Massachusetts man overdosed on heroin, local police 
detectives turned to his social networking pages (on both Facebook 
and MySpace) in order to get clues about the source of the drug and 
with whom the man might have been using.25  The investigating 
detective explained, “People arrange to buy and sell drugs on 
Facebook . . . we’d be foolish not to use it as an investigative tool.”26 
In Cincinnati, the FBI was able to arrest seventy individuals who 
were associated with a violent gang called the “Taliband” by 
analyzing their connections on social networking sites.27  These arrests 
21. Paul Ohm, Lauren Gelman & Jack Bennett, Are You Really My Friend? The
Law and Ethics of Covert or Deceptive Data-Gathering, address at Samuelson 
Conference, (Oct. 23, 2009), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/7458.htm. 
22. See How We Share Information on Facebook’s Privacy Policy, available at
http://www.facebook.com/policy/php (last visited Jan. 25, 2010). 
23. Elect. Frontier Found. v. Dept. of Defense, 2009 WL 4813489 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 1,
2009). 
24. John Carlin, Safety and Social Networks: the Challenge of Community Policing in
a Virtual Neighborhood, at Samuelson Conference, (Oct. 23, 2009), available at http:// 
www.law.berkeley.edu/7458.htm. 
25. Julie Masis, Is This Lawman Your Facebook Friend?  Increasingly, Investigators
Use Social Networking Websites for Police Work, THE BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 11, 2009, at 1 
(NORTHWEST Reg). 
26. Id.  The article also reveals that in an informal survey of 14 departments in the
area (Wilmington, Mass.), officials in half of them said that they use Facebook and 
MySpace when conducting their detective work. 
27. Carlin, supra note 24.
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resulted in a forty percent decrease in violent crimes in the area.28  
The FBI also used social networking data in a Colombia, Ohio gang 
shooting case, which was ironically instigated by discussions on social 
networks themselves.29  By intercepting discussions about being 
“dissed” on MySpace, the FBI was able to establish a motive for a 
violent gang shooting.30 
Facebook also provided the means for the government to 
apprehend a fugitive, Maxi Sopo, who allegedly stole more than 
$200,000 through a bank scam in Seattle.31  While looking through 
Sopo’s “friends” on Facebook, an Assistant United States Attorney 
(“AUSA”) noticed that one of them was a former Department of 
Justice Attorney.32  The AUSA contacted this former attorney, who 
looked through the pictures that Sopo had posted on his Facebook 
profile.33 Sopo’s pictures showed the fugitive partying in Cancun, 
where he was ultimately caught.34 
Carlin also mentions that the government uses social networks to 
catch “tax deadbeats.”35  As he explains, there have been instances 
where individuals “claim poverty to the IRS,” but their social 
networking profiles tell a different story—they brag about all of their 
wealth and assets through photographs and “vivid descriptions.”36 
An interesting dialogue at the Samuelson Conference between 
Paul Ohm, Lauren Gelman, and Supervisory Special FBI agent Jack 
Bennett shed light upon the law and ethics of what some might call 
“deceptive” data gathering.37  Their discussion suggests that most 
states have not clearly defined when it is okay and when it is not okay 
to go undercover to gain information off of social networking sites.38  
Gelman does, however, consider that when a Facebook user changes 
his “network” so that he can gain access to information that is 
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.  It should be noted that in his speech, Carlin did not explain the legal methods
by which the FBI was able to intercept those discussions.  It very well may be that the files 
were publicly available. 
31. Chris Ayres, The Fraud Suspect Who Was Asking to be Caught, THE TIMES
(London),  Oct. 19, 2009, at 38. 





37. Ohm, Gelman & Bennett, supra note 21.
38. Id.
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available in a different network, that constitutes deception.39  And 
Bennett admits that the FBI uses social networks for “ID takeovers” 
when they arrest a “bad guy.”40 
Both Gelman and Ohm think that there must be a new definition 
of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the new world of social 
networks.  Ohm suggests that we “throw out Katz” and find 
something new.41  But, Bennett offers a compelling counter-argument: 
that the whole idea behind social networking is to put information 
“out there for people to see” and therefore, it is “hard to believe” 
that there is an expectation of privacy if a user is “opening up his 
information for everyone to see.”42 
The government’s use of social networking goes beyond criminal 
investigations and can involve matters of national security.  Carlin 
warns that terrorist groups are using those sites to recruit members 
and spread ideologies.43  For example, the Facebook group “Ahlus 
Sunnah wal Jama’ah” has reportedly recruited several students from 
British Universities and their group page contains links to literature 
such as Jihad: a Ten Part Compilation, which commands that all 
Muslims participate in violent jihad.44  If extremist groups are truly 
infiltrating social networking sites, then the government has a 
legitimate interest in accessing data it is believes may threaten the 
United States.  However, the government is unclear about to what 
extent it is privy to the abundant social networking data available.45 
A member of the Facebook legal department explained that 
Facebook is committed to protecting its users’ privacies at all costs.46  
The company has a process in place for responding to subpoenas.47  
According to Facebook, the California-based company applies the 
39. Id.
40. Id.  For example, the FBI will assume the “bad guy’s” Facebook profile when he
is arrested in order to gain access to other potentially incriminating information. 
41. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (extending the Fourth Amendment
to the government’s electronic eavesdropping when a person has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy). 
42. Ohm, Gelman & Bennett, supra note 21.
43. Carlin, supra note 24.
44. Danny Mendez, Facebook and Terrorism: A Love Hate Relationship, (Feb. 15,
2008).  TECH.BLORGE.COM, http://tech.blorge.com/Structure:%20/2008/02/15/facebook-
and-terrorism-a-love-hate-relationship-2/. 
45. See FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2010); See also EFF. v. Dept. of Defense, 2009 WL
4813489 (N.D.Cal. 2009). 
46. Telephone interview with member of Facebook legal department, (Dec. 22, 2009)
(transcript with author). 
47. Id.
 
488 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [33:3
“strictest standards” when local sheriffs serve subpoenas for local 
information, but does not accept out-of-state subpoenas.48  As 
explained in Facebook’s Terms of Service, the company will provide 
information through valid legal process, which includes (as will be 
discussed later) what is statutorily required, and also in cases of 
imminent harm, such as kidnapping or matters of “absolute national 
security.”49 
Recognizing that its primary purpose is to serve as an identity 
service for people across the Internet, Facebook stresses that the site 
balances protecting its users’ data with the countervailing interest of 
assisting law enforcement in accordance with existing statutes.50  
Experts in the field have argued that the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (“ECPA”)51 (discussed in detail in Part Three), which 
regulates the use of online data, is an antiquated statute.52  Given the 
current state of the ECPA, and despite Facebook’s best efforts to 
protect its users, it might be very difficult, from a legal standpoint, for 
providers like Facebook to fully protect its users’ information from 
government access.53 
III. Statutory and Legal Framework
The ECPA comprises the statutory framework that regulates the 
government’s seizure and use of electronic data.54  The ECPA gives 
the government access to both content and non-content data in stored 
wire or electronic communications.  The statute “governs government 
access to stored wire and electronic communications in a ‘facility’ 
through which an electronic communication service is provided.”55  
Sections 2703 and 2709 of the ECPA in particular have been the 
subject of the most relevant litigation about the legal issues 




51. See infra Part III.
52. James Aquilina, Executive Managing Director and Deputy General Counsel at
Stroz Friedberg, Does Overt Access to Social Networking Data Constitute Searching or 
Spying?, address at Samuelson Conference, (Oct. 23, 2009), available at http://www.law. 
berkeley.edu/7458.htm; see also, infra note 52. 
53. Aquilina, supra note 50.
54. Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711
(2010).  The portions of the ECPA discussed in this note are commonly referred to as the 
“Stored Communications Act” (“SCA”). 
55. 18 U.S. NITA prec §2701.
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Under the ECPA section 2703, if the contents of a wire or 
electronic communication have been in electronic storage or in an 
electronic communications system for one hundred and eighty days or 
less, a “governmental entity may require the disclosure . . . only 
pursuant to a warrant issued [pursuant to procedures under Federal 
or State law] . . .”56  If, however, the contents of a wire or electronic 
communication have been in electronic storage in an electronic 
communications system for more than one hundred and eighty days, 
the government may obtain them either by a warrant (without notice 
to the subscriber or customer), by an administrative subpoena 
authorized by a federal or state statute or a federal or state grand jury 
or trial subpoena (with prior notice to the subscriber or customer), or 
a court order for disclosure.57 
The ECPA, as amended and expanded by the USA Patriot Act, 
gives an electronic service provider or a remote computing service 
provider discretion to voluntarily disclose content and non-content 
information to the government.58  If it is determined that the 
“provider, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger 
of death or serious physical injury to any person requires disclosure 
without delay of information relating to the emergency,” he may 
divulge a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or 
customer of such service to a government entity.59 
Section 2709 of the ECPA governs the procedure that allows the 
FBI to gain access to subscriber information or electronic 
communication transactional records if it is relevant to an authorized 
investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine 
intelligence activities.60  In these circumstances, the FBI may request 
(through national security demand letters, (“NSLs”) the “name, 
address, length of service, and local and long distance toll billing 
records of a person,” so long as the government’s investigation of 
such person is not conducted solely on the basis of activities protected 
by the First Amendment.  
Section 2709 also allows the FBI, in the event of national security, 
criminal, counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, to 
prevent disclosure of such a request for information to any person.61  
56. 18 U.S.C. §2703(a).
57. 18 U.S.C. §2703(b).
58. ECPA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2010).
59. 18 U.S.C. §2702(c)(4).
60. 18 U.S.C. §2709(b)(1).
61. 18 U.S.C. §2709(c)(1).
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As will be further discussed, this so-called “gag” provision has been 
the subject of ongoing litigation. 
When the government has attempted to gain access to both 
content and non-content information, litigation has implicated the 
ECPA as it relates to the Fourth Amendment.  The Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens 
“against unreasonable searches and seizures.”62  Although there are 
cases that have dealt with the Fourth Amendment as it applies to 
electronic communications, conspicuously absent is legislation or case 
law that has made the leap to social networking data specifically.63 
To date, the legislation that surrounds government access to 
electronic data, both content and non-content alike, focuses mainly 
upon email and Internet protocol (“IP”) information.  What is more, 
the laws grant the government access to information often with few 
obstacles. 
The seminal case for applying the Fourth Amendment comes 
from Katz v. United States.64  In Katz, the issue was whether the 
government should have been allowed to introduce evidence of 
petitioner’s conversations that were “overheard by FBI agents who 
had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the 
outside of the public telephone booth from which he had placed his 
calls.”65  The court concluded that the “Fourth Amendment protects 
people, not places” and that the “[g]overnment’s activities in 
electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s words 
violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied . . . and thus 
constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.”66 
Today, modern extensions of Katz that bear the most similarity to 
data on social networking sites are those that surround the 
constitutionality of section 2703 of the ECPA, and how it relates to 
the government’s seizure of Internet communications, specifically 
email.  The Supreme Court has yet to formally extend Katz’s Fourth 
62. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
63. There are cases, however, that deal with the identity of Internet chat room and
message board users, but those center mostly on the applicability of the First Amendment 
and its protection of the users’ identities, rather than the Fourth Amendment right to seize 
the information.  Sew eg., Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 
2001). 
64. Joshua L. Simmons, Note, Buying You: The Government’s Use of Fourth Parties
to Launder Data About “The People,” COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 950, 960–61 (2009).  See also 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
65. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
66. Id. at 351, 353.
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Amendment protection to email, and Congress has yet to amend the 
ECPA “even as electronic communication technologies have been 
modified and improved.”67  The lower courts, however, seem to be 
pushing for a change. 
One such case is Warshak v. United States68 where an Ohio District 
Court “boldly” extended Fourth Amendment protection to email. 
This decision affirmed by the Sixth Circuit on December 14, 2010, 
holds that the government must have a search warrant before it can 
secretly seize and search emails stored by email service providers.69  A 
closer examination of the case provides a useful insight into the 
debate over information privacy and issues that are arising under the 
ECPA as technology progresses at a rapid rate. 
In Warshak, the government obtained two orders under the 
ECPA’s section 2703(d) to search Steven Warshak’s emails after 
Warshak’s company, Berkeley Premium Nutraceuticals, Inc., became 
the target of an investigation into “mail and wire fraud, money 
laundering, and other federal offense[es].”70  The magistrate judge 
granted the application under section 2703(d), which gave the 
government access to, among other things, the contents of emails that 
had been “accessed, viewed, or downloaded” or that were more than 
181 days old.71  After receiving notice of the orders about a year later, 
Warshak filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate 
section 2703(d) under the Fourth Amendment and moved for a 
preliminary injunction, “seeking to enjoin the government from 
conducting further ex parte e-mail searches.”72  The district court 
granted Warshak’s injunction, reasoning that Warshak would likely 
succeed on his Fourth Amendment claim “because [I]nternet users 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mails . . .”73 
After a lengthy subsequent history, the Sixth Circuit announced 
that electronic communication “deserved more protection than . . . 
ECPA provides,”74 but later proceeded to vacate the opinion, 
ultimately arguing that Warshak’s Fourth Amendment claim was not 
67. Tamar R. Gubins, Note, Warshak v. United States: The Katz for Electronic
Communication, 23 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 723, 744 (Annual Review, 2008). 
68. Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Warshak I”).
69. Gubins, supra note 66, at 727; see also United States v. Steven Warshak, 2010 U.S.
App. LEXIS 25415, at *2 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Warshak II”). 
70. Warshak I, 532 F.3d at 523, 524 (internal quotations omitted).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 523.
73. Id. at 524–25.
74. Gubins supra note 66 at 725.
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ripe for judicial resolution.75  One reason the court gave was that 
“[t]he Supreme Court ha[d] been especially reluctant to invalidate 
statutes on their face under the Fourth Amendment.”76  In vacating 
the preliminary injunction and remanding the case to the district 
court to dismiss Warshak’s constitutional claim, the Sixth Circuit held 
that Warshak “still retained the right to challenge the district court’s 
resolution of his motion . . . through an appeal of his criminal 
conviction.”77 
Finally, in its December 14, 2010 opinion, the Sixth Circuit 
monumentally extended Katz’s Fourth Amendment protection to 
email.78  The court reasoned: 
Since the advent of e-mail, the telephone call and the letter 
have waned in importance, and an explosion of Internet-based 
communication has taken place. People are now able to send 
sensitive and intimate information, instantaneously, to friends, 
family, and colleagues half a world away. Lovers exchange 
sweet nothings, and businessmen swap ambitious plans, all 
with the click of a mouse button.79 
When analogizing the situation in Warshak to the social 
networking world, it is difficult to know where exactly to extend the 
analysis.  Facebook users, for example, can send messages to each 
other, which function like emails.  However, would the information 
that a user posts to his profile be considered email communication? 
Perhaps the only way to assess what section of the ECPA applies is to 
determine how long the content had been on the site and whether it 
was “stored” for purposes of the statute. 
For example, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection does not apply when an individual 
voluntarily discloses information to a third party.80  In United States v. 
Forrester (where defendants were charged with offenses relating to an 
ecstasy-manufacturing laboratory), the Ninth Circuit relied primarily 
upon a Supreme Court surveillance case, Smith v. Maryland, which 
75. Warshak I, 532 F.3d at 523.
76. Id. at 529.
77. Id. at 534.
78. See Warshak II, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008).
79. Id. at 31–32.
80. United States v. Forrester, 495 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 2007), (quoting Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979)). 
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involved the constitutionality of pen registers.81  Both defendants 
were convicted on all counts, and defendant Alba appealed, 
challenging the validity of the government’s computer surveillance.82 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the government’s surveillance 
was analogous to the use of a pen register as defined in Smith v. 
Maryland and therefore did not constitute a search for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.83  Furthermore, the court concluded that “e-
mail and Internet users have no expectation of privacy in the to/from 
addresses of their messages or the IP addresses of the websites they 
visit because they should know that these messages are sent and these 
IP addresses are accessed through the equipment of their Internet 
service provider and other third parties.”84 
As social networking sites continue to grow and be a principle 
means for people to form connections and share information, it is 
unsurprising that terrorist groups are also taking advantage of this 
online medium.85  Therefore, the government’s access to data 
involving issues of national security falls under the ECPA’s section 
2709, which has also been the subject of recent litigation. 
Two cases present an illustration of the issues that have arisen as 
a result of the Patriot Act’s expansion of the government’s access to 
information through the ECPA and the difficulty that the lower 
courts are having in resolving the delicate balance between national 
security concerns, the ECPA’s section 2709, and individual privacy. 
In Doe v. Ashcroft, plaintiffs, who included the American Civil 
Liberties Union (“ACLU”), challenged the constitutionality of the 
ECPA’s section 270986 broad subpoena power with regards to the 
FBI’s issuance of NSLs.87  In this case, the lead plaintiff (John Doe), 
was an Internet access firm that received an NSL.88 
 Section 2709 “bars all NSL recipients from ever disclosing that 
the FBI has issued an NSL.”89  The District Court concluded that 1) 
section 2709’s nondisclosure provision violates the Fourth 
81. Id. at 1043.  A pen register is a device that records numbers dialed from a phone
line. 
82. Id.
83. Id. (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (holding that the use of a pen register
does not constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes)). 
84. Forrester, 495 F.3d at 1049; (Internal citation omitted).
85. See Carlin, supra note 24.
86. 18 U.S.C. §2709.  See also supra notes 46, 48.
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Amendment because “at least as currently applied, it effectively bars 
or substantially deters any judicial challenge to the propriety of the 
NSL request, and 2) “the permanent ban on disclosure contained in 
section 2709(c) . . . operates as an unconstitutional prior restraint on 
speech in violation of the First Amendment.”90 
A similar issue arose in Doe v. Gonzalez.91  There, the plaintiff, a 
member of a library association, received an NSL requesting 
“information . . . associated with a ‘specific Internet Protocol 
address.’”92  The complaint alleged that the “gag imposed by section 
2709(c) is an unlawful prior restraint on speech.”93 
The district court applied strict scrutiny and concluded that the 
permanent gag provision of the statute was not “narrowly drawn to 
serve the government’s broadly claimed compelling interest of 
keeping investigations secret” and granted Doe’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction.94  A panel for the Second Circuit then issued 
an order staying the preliminary injunction to give the federal 
government an opportunity to file an expedited appeal.95  Upon that 
panel’s denial of the applicant’s subsequent motion to vacate the stay, 
petitioners filed an emergency application to the Supreme Court.96  
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, held that the applicants had 
not shown cause “so extraordinary as to justify [the] Court’s 
intervention” while the action was pending in the Second Circuit.97 
Although the government accesses social networking data 
through statutory means, it also does so by sidestepping them. While 
statutory mechanisms are in place for the official solicitation of data, 
as shown by the litigation surrounding sections 2703 and 2709, the 
government has used undercover identities and deceptive practices to 
gain access to social networking information-actions that are not 
necessarily illegal under current standards.98 
In Theofel v. Farey-Jones, the Ninth Circuit considered “whether 
defendants violated electronic privacy and computer fraud statutes 
when they used a patently unlawful subpoena to gain access to e-mail 
90. Id.  See also supra notes 58, 60.
91. Doe v. Gonzalez, 546 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2005).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1304–05 (internal citation omitted).
95. Id. at 1301–02.
96. Id. at 1302.
97. Id. at 1308.
98. See supra Part II (including an in-depth look at the government’s use of
undercover agents on social networking sites). 
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stored by plaintiff’s Internet service provider.”99  Although the case 
involved private parties and not the government, the court provided 
some useful dicta on deception as it applies to the ECPA’s section 
2701.  The court noted that the Stored Communications Act “protects 
individuals’ privacy and proprietary interests” and “reflects 
Congress’s judgment that users have a legitimate interest in the 
confidentiality of communications in electronic storage at a 
communications facility.”100 
Although the court stated that a defendant is not liable for 
trespass if the plaintiff authorized his entry, it found that a police 
officer who “invited in a home, conceals a recording device for the 
media” is liable.101  More specifically, the deceit must be a “substantial 
mistake . . . concerning the nature of the invasion or the extent of the 
harm.”102  The court then construed section 2701 in light of that 
analysis, holding that “permission to access a stored communication 
does not constitute valid authorization if it would not defeat a 
trespass claim in analogous circumstances.”103 
IV. Analysis and Proposal
As courts have struggled with the ECPA as it applies to the 
ongoing growth of technology, many have noted that the ECPA 
“provide[s] quite narrowly defined protections [and that] [t]hese 
limited provisions do not address the broad, ongoing changes in 
communications technologies.”104  The ACLU has also commented on 
the intersection between technology, liberty, and surveillance, arguing 
that the USA Patriot Act has “vastly expanded the FBI’s authority to 
collect information about people it does not suspect of wrongdoing, 
including financial, credit and communications information, using 
NSLs . . .”105  Michael Macleod-Ball, Acting Director of the ACLU 
Washington Legislative Office, argues, “[o]nce again, the FBI has 
been found to be using invasive ‘counterterrorism’ tools to collect 
99. 341 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir. 2003), amended 359 F.3d 1066.
100. Id. at 982.
101. Id. at 982–83 (internal citations omitted).
102. Id. at 983 (internal citation omitted).
103. Id.
104. Gubins, supra note 66, at 740.
105. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, FBI Data Mining and Collection
Programs Threaten Privacy of Innocent Americans (Sept. 24, 2009), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/pring/national-security_technology-and-liberty/fbi-data-mining-and-
collection-programs-threaten-privacy-in (emphasis added). 
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personal information about innocent Americans . . . with little or no 
oversight.”106 
Thus, there are two main factors that necessitate a change.  First, 
the ECPA has been expanded by the USA Patriot Act such that there 
are often few obstacles preventing the government from gaining 
access to data on social networking sites.  Second, the rapid growth of 
the social networking world has changed the way people 
communicate across the Internet.  Data sharing has gone from the age 
of email messages and IP address logs into a murky web of social 
networks and “wall posts.”  Therefore, the statutory and legal 
frameworks that currently exist are insufficient to encompass the way 
that contents are shared across the social network medium.  Nor is 
this shift reflected in either the provisions of the ECPA or in the 
courts’ applications of them. 
For example, it is not entirely clear how section 2703 applies to a 
site like Facebook.  There are probably messages and data that fall 
into the category of content that has been posted on the site for one 
hundred and eighty days or less, but what about the constant user 
behavior and interactions that comprise so much of what makes social 
networking sites unique? 
The problem of what is content and non-content on social 
networking sites also confuses the issue.  How would the non-content 
provisions of section 2703 that Forrester analogized to pen registers 
and applied to the “to/from” addresses in emails apply to behavior on 
Facebook?  For example, the courts could extend that analogy to the 
social networking context by removing the expectation of privacy 
from data that a user makes public.  For some users, that is merely 
who they are friends with on Facebook and the networks to which 
they belong, while for others it’s virtually everything on their profiles. 
Although there is a compelling argument under Warshak II that 
Facebook messages, like email, could likely be subject to a user’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy, less clear is how far that 
reasonable expectation extends.  Of course, any information that a 
user purposely makes open and publicly available to the millions on 
Facebook would be fair game.  However, the problem lies in the 
murkier realm of semi-protected data—that is, data that a user only 
intends to share with those in a particular limited friend network. 
The photos and status updates that a user makes available to that 
limited friend network cannot be classified the same way as a private 
message intended between two people.  However, a user’s ability to 
106.  Id.
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control how far the sharing of such data extends is a difficult issue 
unique to Facebook and the “network” setting, since that network 
could include every person in a large geographic region such as San 
Francisco, or a limited group of close friends. 
Another problem with the ECPA is in the gag provision of section 
2709 that is currently the subject of much debate.  If social networks 
are quickly becoming a convenient place to facilitate terrorist 
communication, then sites like Facebook become an easy target for 
the government.  If an NSL demands that Facebook hand over the 
profile information for a suspected terrorist involved in a matter of 
national security, it is likely that the government will also gain access 
to information that is not necessarily pertinent to the investigation. 
This is because the data on social networks is not as clearly defined or 
as compartmentalized as data in emails, for example. 
As is evidenced by the current case law surrounding section 2703 
and section 2709 specifically, these issues will only continue to present 
themselves in the social networking age.  Although the case law as it 
currently stands extends primarily to email and ISP information, it 
seems that even there, the courts have been reluctant to make any 
Fourth Amendment extensions without statutory revisions from 
Congress. 
There needs to be some sort of action from Congress, therefore, 
remodeling the ECPA to reflect the technological changes that have 
boomed in the past few years.  There also needs to be a new Katz, as 
Ohm suggested, that defines the Fourth Amendment as it pertains to 
social networks.  With that definition needs to come an explanation of 
what is considered “deception” in the social network medium. 
Unfortunately, a cop posing as a drug dealer on the streets to catch a 
criminal is not necessarily the same thing as an FBI agent who 
assumes a real person’s online identity when that person is taken into 
custody. 
The counter-argument—that people who post content should be 
aware of how visible it is to others—is a compelling one.  In a culture 
so hooked on sharing information at rapid rates, people need to be 
aware that sometimes, what seems private is in fact not so. 
Regardless, while some of these individuals may be at fault for 
making their data widely known, those who have chosen to keep their 
online identities far more private will still be susceptible to 
government investigations that are currently not banned by either the 
ECPA or Supreme Court precedent. 
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V. Conclusion
While it remains unclear to what extent the government is 
actually using the data from social networks under the ECPA, the 
Samuelson Conference makes it abundantly clear that the 
government is obtaining the information.  As forums continue to 
allow individuals to post content about themselves and communicate 
on a widespread level with others, courts are in need of greater 
guidance with respect to the government’s search for online 
information. 
